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THE IMPACT OF POLICE MISCONDUCT IN KINGS COUNTY  
ON NEW YORK CITY’S CIVIL LIABILITY 2006-2010. 
 
By 
Brian A. Maule 
 
Adviser: Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld 
The confluence of police misconduct and civil liability is an issue of growing concern for 
many communities throughout the U.S. today. The gravamen of the issue is evident in increases 
in the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct and the civil liability that results from these 
lawsuits. 
In New York City during the period 1997-2005 the cost for police misconduct went from 
$27.9 million in 1997 to $40.4 million in 2005 (Thompson, 2007).  Concerns over these 
increases have resulted in efforts to curb both the number of lawsuits brought against the New 
York Police Department and the civil liability to the City that results from these lawsuits. 
The study examines and describes the impact of allegations of police misconduct in 
Kings County during the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil liability. Using allegations 
of police misconduct in lawsuits that resulted in a settlement or jury award as a measure of police 
misconduct, the study provides evidence of the increasing costs of police misconduct in Kings 
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County, New York. The study found that the increasing financial impact that police misconduct 
had on the City during the years studied was not the result of the increasing costs of settlements 
and jury awards per se but rather the increase in the number of lawsuits vis-à-vis the increase in 
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The confluence of police misconduct and civil liability is an issue of growing concern for 
many communities throughout the U.S. today. On the one hand the concern of police and 
municipal officials is the financial burden that resulted from lawsuits alleging police misconduct 
(Emery and Maazel, 2000; Ross, 2000; Vaughn et al., 2001),
1
 On the other hand, the concern is 
the social injury to the general community particularly in this new era of community policing. 
The gravity of the issue is evident in nation-wide increases in the number of lawsuits alleging 
police misconduct and the civil liability that results from these lawsuits (Champion, 2001; U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 1998).  For example, research by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (2001) found a ten times increase in the number of 
civil lawsuits filed against police officers and their departments in the years 1976-1991. 
According to Ross (2000) the average plaintiff’s (the person who initiated the lawsuit) award for 
police misconduct in the U.S. during the years 1989-1999 was more than $492,000 with an 
additional $60,000 awarded for attorney fees. This compares to the average non-police tort 
award of $52,000 nation-wide (U.S. Dept. Justice, 1996). 
In New York City (“City”) during the period 1977-2005 the cost for police misconduct 
went from $27.9 million in 1997 to $40.4 million in 2005 (Thompson, 2007).  Concerns over 
these increases have resulted in efforts to curb both the number of lawsuits brought against the 
New York Police Department (“NYPD”) and the civil liability of the City that results from these 
lawsuits.
2
 Nevertheless, despite many efforts year after year the City continues to spend millions 
of dollars to litigate civil lawsuits brought against the NYPD for alleged officer misconduct.
3
 For 
example, there were 35,379 incidents of misconduct alleged against officers of the NYPD in the 
period 2006-2010.
 
These incidents resulted in 14,955 legal claims
4
 and 193 million dollars paid 
2 
 
to settle these claims.
 5
 This compares to 25,999 incidents and 176.6 million dollars paid in 
settlements and jury awards for the period 2001-2005.
6
 This is in addition to significant but less 
obvious litigation costs, arguably in the millions, including but not limited to employee salaries 
investigating the allegations, and sometimes trial expenses to defend these claims. While these 
increases were city-wide, they were more pronounced in Bronx and Kings Counties. For 
example, in Kings County alone (Brooklyn) there was a 70% increase in the number of 
allegations for 2006-2010 compared to the period 2001-2005 and a 269% increase in civil 
liability to the City. 
The study examines and describes the impact of allegations of police misconduct in 
Kings County during the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil liability. Allegations of 
police misconduct that resulted in a settlement or jury award were used as a measure of police 
misconduct. The study reviewed 2076 lawsuits filed in Kings County New York during the years 
2006-2010 to examine and describe the impact of police misconduct on the City’s civil liability. 
Allegations of police misconduct in Kings County were chosen because, as the most populous 
borough of the City, and demographically representative of the entire city, it was expected that a 
larger number of lawsuits would be brought in Kings County than in the other NYC boroughs. 
Furthermore, prior research showed that the crime rate in both the Eastern District and Southern 
District of New York
7
 are comparable, and although arrest rates are higher in the Southern 
District than they are in the Eastern District, the number of §1983 lawsuits
8
 per 100,00 of the 
population is higher in the Eastern District (Chiabi, 1995). Therefore, an empirical understanding 
of the impact of allegations of police misconduct in Kings County on the City’s civil liability can 
be generalized to the entire city. It was also possible that the yearly increases in both the number 
of lawsuits filed against the NYPD and the resulting climb in total civil liability for Kings 
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County would imply that existing NYPD policies and programs were inadequate at preventing 
police misconduct city-wide and as such, may be contributing to the City’s civil liability.  
 
Statement of the Problem 
In recent years New Yorkers have experienced several high-profiled lawsuits against the 
NYPD as a result of questionable police actions. From the sodomy of Abner Louima, the killings 
of Amadou Diallo and Sean Bell, to the increasing number of civilian complaints and lawsuits 
filed as a result of the NYPD’s Stop, Question and Frisk program, questions of the 
appropriateness of police conduct and the adequacy of the City’s civil liability remain issues of 
contentious debate. Moreover, while these incidents tend to galvanize public discourse that 
continue long after they occur, it is the social injury that results, and the fact that these incidents 
may represent increases in police misconduct and civil liability that concern some New York 
City officials (Liu, 2010).
9
 
Official data from the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) show that there were 
12,504 incidents of alleged police misconduct in Kings County for the years 2006-2010.
10
 These 
civilian complaints resulted in 2076 lawsuits at a cost of more than $56.2 million to the City (See 
Table 4.5). As shown in Table 4.2 these numbers also reflect a trend of yearly increases in 
allegations of police misconduct. 
Highlighting this trend of increasing allegations of police misconduct and resulting civil 
liability is the fact that in compiling their annual reports, successive Comptrollers noted that the 
NYPD was the only New York City agency
11
 to experience an increase in the number of lawsuits 
brought against it in each of the fiscal years 2001-2006 (Thompson, 2007) and surpassed all 
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The increases in police misconduct and resulting civil liability were even more 
problematic because they occurred at a time when New York City, like most U.S. cities were 
financially strapped and the NYPD, like other police departments throughout the U.S., had 
embraced community-oriented policing which requires greater police accountability and 
increased public involvement in fighting crime (Human Rights Watch, 1998). 
 
Purpose of Study 
The financial impact of police misconduct lawsuits on municipalities in the U.S. is well 
documented (del Carmen, 1991; Hall et al., 2003; Kappeler, 1993; Kappeler & Kappeler, 1993; 
Silver, 2001; Stevens, 2001; Thrum, 1992; Vaughn & Coomes, 1995; Vaughn, 1999; Vaughn et 
al., 2001; Worrall, 2001; Pipes & Pape, 2001; Kappeler, Kappeler  & del Carmen, 1993; Escholz 
& Vaughn, 2001; Kappeler & Vaughn, 1997; Vaughn & Kappeler, 1999; Ross, 2000; Vaughn et 
al., 2001) and more specifically the impact of §1983 lawsuits
13
 in Central California (Eisenberg 
& Schwab, 1987); in Pennsylvania and Georgia (Schwab & Eisenberg, 1988), and with Bivens 
actions
14
 in the Southern and Eastern District of New York (Chiabi, 1995). However, the impact 
of allegations of police misconduct in Kings County for the years 2006-2010 on New York 
City’s civil liability was uncertain. 
Therefore, although egregious incidents of police misconduct in the City were well 
publicized and past studies (Cohen, 1972; Kane, 2001; Kane, 2002; Reuss-Ianni, 1983) and 
commissions (Knapp, 1972; Mollen, 1994) explored and documented them, none explored the 
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impact of allegations of police misconduct in Kings County on the City’s civil liability for the 
years 2006-2010. 
While it is accepted that an allegation of police misconduct may not be equal to actual 
police misconduct, an allegation being simply a claim and not uncontroverted evidence of the 
incident, given the adversarial and expositive nature of the judicial system arguably a settlement 
or a jury award based on an allegation can be interpreted as a substantiated probability that the 
alleged incident did in fact occur. It is within this context that the study sought to fill the gap by 
examining the impact of allegations of police misconduct in Kings County during the years 
2006-2010 on the City’s civil liability. Using allegations of police misconduct that resulted in a 
settlement or jury award as a measure of police misconduct, the study addressed the following 
broad question: what was the impact of police misconduct in Kings County on New York City’s 
civil liability for the years 2006-2010? 
The following research questions informed by independent causes of action alleged in 
lawsuits were used to accomplish this: 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between allegations of false arrest and civil 
liability? 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between allegations of assault/battery and 
civil liability? 
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between allegations of a police shooting 
and civil liability? 
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between allegations of inadequate police 
training and civil liability? 
6 
 
Chapter II Literature Review 
  
 By its very nature, policing in general is a complex and unique occupation (Alpert and 
McDonald, 2001; Cohen, 1996). In the U.S. the characteristics of public accountability, openness 
to evaluation and responsiveness to citizen demands (Bayley, 1998) contribute to the inimitable 
nature of policing in that police officers, in interpreting and applying static and dynamic rules, 
are legally permitted to act in ways, such as using deadly force, that would be criminal if 
committed by a civilian (Alpert and McDonald, 2001; Cohen, 1996). Furthermore, by working in 
isolation from public observation, police officers are provided with ample opportunities to 
misuse their authority (Dunningham and Norris, 1998; Escholz and Vaughn, 2001; Moran, 2005) 
in what some have argued is an occupation conducive to malpractice (Hunter, 1999; Ivkovic, 
2004). Moreover, the unique character of policing, and the lack of consensus on the frequency of 
police misconduct, with some arguing that it is rare (Chappell and Piquero, 2004) and others the 
opposite (Ivkovich, 2003; Worden and Catlin, 2002), make police misconduct difficult to define 
and difficult to document (Kane and White, 2009). 
 
Police Misconduct 
Police misconduct, like any other behavior that deviates from the norms of a society, is as 
varied and diverse as the norms themselves. This is apparent in the ease with which some forms 
of police behavior can readily be labeled as misconduct but it also underlies the difficulty in 
articulating a cogent definition of the term.  
One well accepted definition proffered by Roebuck and Barker (1974) defines police 
misconduct as behavior that is deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal. Similar broad 
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definitions have been suggested by Skogan and Meares (2004) and by Klenig (2006). While 
these definitions specify “police misconduct” as the term being defined, arguably they can be 
attributed to malpractice in almost any profession and they do not capture the unparalleled 
authority that police officers possess, and the “or else” power that underlies every command 
from police officer to civilian. 
The U.S. Supreme Court provides a more nuanced definition of police misconduct as the 
“[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of the state” (Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 
U.S. 922-929,1982). In other words the police officer uses his or her authority to engage in job-
specific malpractice (Kane, 2002). While more acceptable, at its core this definition seems to 
suggests that police misconduct is an affirmative “misuse of power.” Therefore, in recognizing 
that police misconduct can also include acquiescence or non-action, such as the acceptance of 
free meals or the disregard of a legal obligation, in operationalizing police misconduct, 
researchers have used behaviors as diverse as corruption (Sherman, 1978); wrongful death 
(Kappeler, Vaughn and del Carmen, 1991); use of excessive force (Thurm, 1992); police sexual 
violence (Escholz and Vaughn, 2001; Kappeler and Vaughn, 1997); acceptance of free meals 
(Alpert and Dunhan, 1997) and sleeping while on duty (Barker and Carter, 1994) to examine it. 
Moreover, because of the variance in operationalizing police misconduct, it is generally a 
well-accepted argument that every police organization has experienced some form of misconduct 
during its existence (Kappeler at al., 1998; McCafferty, Souryal and McCafferty, 1998). 
Furthermore, by its nature, policing provides multiple opportunities for deviance and malpractice 
(Barker, 1997; Ivkovic, 2004), because of policing’s low visibility to public observation 
(Goldstein, 1960; Haar, 1997; Haar & Morash, 1999) in addition to the difficulty in defining it, 
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police misconduct is also difficult to document (Kane and White, 2009), and efforts to identify 
its correlates have been inconclusive (Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Fyfe & Kane, 2006). Most of 
the difficulty in documenting police misconduct lies in the unique nature of policing itself (King 
2009; Manning 2009), as police officials and officers tend to define behavior that constitutes 
misconduct narrowly while the public defines it broadly (Adams, 1996; Lersch, 1998b; Lersch 
and Mieczkowski, 2000). This disparity in determining what behavior constitutes police 
misconduct is evident in the number of public complaints filed against police officers compared 
to the number of those complaints that are substantiated by the agency charged with investigating 
the complaints. For example, in New York City there were 52,049 formal complaints of police 
misconduct filed with the City’s Civilian Complaints Review Board (“CCRB”)
 15
 for the period 
2006-2010. These complaints resulted in 36,743 investigations
16
 but only 1,513 of those 
complaints were substantiated by the CCRB.
 
 
Still, while less than 3% of formal complaints of NYPD officer misconduct allegations 
filed during 2006-2010 were substantiated, whether as a result of more civil rights conscious 
citizens, an increasingly litigious society, controversial actions such as the NYPD’s Stop and 
Possibly Frisk program,
17
 or some of each, the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct 
against NYPD officers and the civil liability that resulted, increased during the period 2006-
2010. 






 False arrest is an allegation that police acting under color of law violated the individual’s 
freedom of movement without having probable cause to do so. In most lawsuits it is a 
warrantless arrest and is presumptively illegal because it is made without the judicial process that 
is required in obtaining a warrant (Broughton v. State, 1975). This distinction is notable because 
an allegation of a false arrest places the burden of proof on the police to show that probable 
cause existed to make the arrest. 
 
Police shooting. 
A police shooting when claimed to have violated the victim’s Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from search and seizure
18
 is based on the allegation that the force used was excessive and 
therefore unreasonable (Stein v. State 53 A.D. 2d 988, 1976). According to the U.S. Supreme 
Court the legality of the use of force is determined by whether or not the force used was 
objectively reasonable and therefore must be evaluated within the context of the “severity of the 
crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 
others, and whether [the individual] actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest.” 
(Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396). 
 
Assault/Battery.  
Although these are two separate acts, they are usually pled and adjudicated together. 
When alleged in a police misconduct lawsuit, assault/battery like a police shooting is based on 




Inadequate police training. 
10 
 
Inadequate police training is claimed in some police misconduct lawsuits regardless of 
the violation alleged and the injury claimed. A lawsuit filed in a federal court against the NYPD 
oftentimes claims that the City failed to “train, supervise and discipline” the police officer 
alleged to have violated the individual’s constitutional rights. A lawsuit filed in a state court 
often alleges that the City was negligent in the “hiring, training and retention” of the police 
officer who is the subject of the lawsuit. The difference is notable because while an allegation in 
a state court (negligent hiring) is almost impossible to prove because it is a ministerial act 
cloaked in immunity, an allegation in a federal court (inadequate police training and retention) is 
subjected to an objective standard and may not be so cloaked (Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 1982) 
Although federal and state lawsuits were adjudicated in different forums, because both 
assert police training as a cause of action and because the data used in this study comprised both 
federal and state lawsuits, both claims were consolidated in this study as “inadequate police 
training.”  
Law enforcement, including the use of deadly force, is often a matter of individual 
judgment and individual discretion (Hayden, 1980). Nevertheless, that judgment and the use of 
discretionary authority must be within the guidelines of the required conduct first learned in the 
police academy (Harris, 1973, Kappeler et al., 1998). Therefore, although recruitment, selection 
and training provide qualified police officers to do the job, to get the job done right, the officer 
must work within the guidelines of his or her training. Thus, despite some contention that 
training is an inadequate method of preventing police misconduct (Emery & Mazel, 2000) it is 
generally accepted that not only does training reduce incidents of police misconduct (Collins, 
1997; Vaughn and Coomes, 1995) but proactive policing itself may be unsuccessful without 
proactive training (Haberfeld, 2002).  Moreover, even though the effectiveness of training to 
11 
 
prevent police misconduct and thus civil liability is debatable, not many would disagree that it 
should continue to be a part of any police academy curriculum. In fact, Scogin and Brodsky 
(1991), in a survey of police academy cadets found that cadets were concerned about work-
related lawsuits. This suggests that the academy is the appropriate place to establish awareness of 
the impact of police misconduct on a municipality’s civil liability. 
 
Police Misconduct and Civil liability 
It is well accepted that the control of police misconduct, like crime itself, is directly 
related to the performance of the government, and to the safety and perceived well-being of 
citizens in a democratic society (Franklin, 1999). Efforts to curb police misconduct can be 
classified based on whether these efforts are regulatory, legislative or judicial (Swanson, Territo 
and Taylor, 2001). Regulatory controls are basically administrative and involve disciplinary 
measures within the police organization aimed at controlling individual officer conduct (Iris, 
1998). Legislative and judicial efforts come in the form of statutes and court decisions and are 
aimed at the individual police officer and his or her organization. They include criminal 
prosecutions of police officers which are rare (Amnesty International, 2000) though effective at 
punishing the individual police officer and deterring others (Agathocleous, 1998) and civil 
lawsuits against officers and/or their police organizations which are ubiquitous and aimed mostly 
at reforming the police organization and its subculture (Agathocleous, 1998; Barrineau, 1994; 
Fallon & Meltzer, 1991; Gilles, 2001). Besides an individual officer’s conduct is often shaped by 
the subculture of the organization (Kappeler et al., 1998) and prior studies suggest that legislative 
and judicial efforts may be more effective at controlling misconduct than regulatory efforts 
because in targeting the organization and its subculture (Reiner, 1998) with prescribed civil 
12 
 
liability, legislative and judicial efforts provide an incentive for police departments to modify 
their training of their police officers (Papik, 2004). 
In New York City legislative and judicial efforts are effectuated with the filing of civilian 
complaints and/or lawsuits. Allegations of police misconduct in the City are investigated either 
by the CCRB or the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) with jurisdiction determined by 
the nature of the complaint. Allegations of the use of force, whether or not it is alleged to be 
excessive, abuse of authority, discourtesy or use of foul language, are investigated by the CCRB. 
By comparison, if what is alleged involves serious physical injury or death then the investigation 
is done by the IAB.
20
 Even if not substantiated by the CCRB or IAB, complaints of police 
misconduct that allegedly violated the individual’s U.S. or New York state constitutional rights 
are legally actionable, and if successful, impose civil liability on the City. For example, of the 
10,548 CCRB and IAB complaints of misconduct alleged in 2010 against NYPD officers,
21
 some 
3,987 new claims resulted and the City paid approximately $56.4 million dollars in judgments 
and settlements for existing claims.
22
 This compares to 9,048 complaints, 2,221 lawsuits and 25 
million dollars for 2006. These increases in both the number of claims of police misconduct and 
the resulting civil liability in New York City, while of concern to City officials (Liu, 2011, 
Thompson, 2007), exemplify the growing nexus between police misconduct and civil liability 




Legal basis for civil Liability. 
New York City was first exposed to civil liability for the acts or omissions of its 
employees in 1945 when New York’s highest state court, the Court of Appeals, held that “civil 
divisions of the State are answerable equally with individuals and private corporations for 
13 
 
wrongs of officers and employees”  (Bernadine v. City, 294 N.Y. 361, 365. 1945).  This case in 
effect abolished the long held doctrine of sovereign immunity for municipalities of New York 
State.
24
 However, because it came from a state court, the ruling did not apply to federal civil 
rights violations. 
Some 16 years later in the seminal case of Monroe v. Pape, 365 US 167 (1961) the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. was the basis for individual police officer liability because 
the police conduct alleged violated the constitutional rights of the victim. In this case Monroe 
and his wife were held naked in their living room by thirteen Chicago police officers while their 
home was searched without a search warrant. Monroe was subsequently held in jail for ten hours 
and later released without being charged with a crime. Monroe sued both the individual police 
officers and the City of Chicago. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the individual officers were 
civilly liable but the City of Chicago was not because it was not a “person”
25
 within the meaning 
of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
In 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself, holding that municipalities were in fact 
“persons” and equally important the Court rejected the argument that a municipality was 
vicariously liable whenever a police officer violated an individual’s constitutional rights. The 
municipality was liable only if the violated individual could prove the existence of an official 
policy, practice, custom or usage that deprived him or her of a federal constitutional or federal 
statutory right (Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In 
application the City of New York is liable for the misconduct of NYPD officers if the individual 
alleging the violation can show that his or her injury was the result of some official policy, 
practice or custom of the NYPD. More specifically, the individual alleging the violation must 
show that the NYPD had a formal written policy or procedure that expressly violated a federal 
14 
 
constitutional or federal statutory right (Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.1, 1985)
26
 or a practice, 
usage or custom arising out of the City’s failure to adequately train its police officers (Canton v. 
Harris 489 U.S. 378, 1989).  
To establish a practice, usage or custom it must be shown that the officer’s inadequate 
police training was the result of the NYPD’s deliberate indifference to federal constitutional or 
federal statutory rights of the individual, or, alternatively that if after having notice of the 
violation by its police officers, the NYPD failed to address the problem by providing further 
corrective training of its police officers. Without proof of these conditions, there is no municipal 
civil liability, and if a violation did occur then there is only personal civil liability against the 
individual police officer (Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 1986).  
Whether the defendant is the NYPD, the individual police officer, or both, most lawsuits 
alleging NYPD officer misconduct are brought under federal statute 42 U.S.C. §1983
27
 which for 
a number of reasons has become an effective means of obtaining relief for federal constitutional 
or federal statutory violations (Barrineau, 1987; Kappeler, 1993; McCoy, 1986, 1987). 
 
42 U.S.C. §1983. 
 Enacted into law on April 20, 1871, the Civil Rights Act codified as 42 U.S.C. 
§1983 (“Act”) in relevant part provides that 
  
“every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or Causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or Other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the Deprivation of any rights, 
15 
 
privileges, or immunities Secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 




The Act’s original purpose was to provide civil remedies for African Americans whose 
constitutional rights were violated by government officials who were also members of the Klu 
Klux Klan (“KKK”).
29
 Enforcement of the Act was so effective against the KKK that with the 
Klan’s decline much of the Act fell into disuse until 1961 (Gaines, Kappeler & Vaughn, 1997; 
Means, 2004) when the U.S. Supreme Court held that one purpose of the Act was to supplement 
state remedies if those remedies were inadequate or unavailable (Monroe v. Pape 365 US 167, 
1961). 
Although the Act’s original purpose and early use was to go after individual Klan 
members, and §1983 of the Act explicitly states “person”, in 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court 
interpreted the term “person” to include a municipal government.
30
 This interpretation of the 
term “person” to include a municipal government permits a police officer to be sued both in his 
or her official and individual capacity. If the lawsuit is against the officer in his or her official 
capacity then the lawsuit is essentially against the municipality. In contrast if the lawsuit is 
against the police officer individually then the police officer is personally liable for the resulting 
settlement or jury award because the injured party is seeking damages against the officer and not 
from the municipality.
31
 Meanwhile, indemnification even when the police officer is personally 
liable often resulted in the City paying the lion’s share of the settlement or jury award.
32
 
In 1971 in the case of Bivens v. Six Unnamed Defendants the U.S. Supreme Court 
expanded the application of 42 U.S.C. §1983 to include federal employees.
33
 With this expansion 
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any law enforcement officer, whether federal, state or municipal if acting under color of law,
34
 
can be individually liable for violating an individual’s constitutional or statutory rights. 
The result of these interpretations of 42 U.S.C. together with citizens’ increased 
awareness of their civil rights have “made Section 1983 the most utilized and lucrative form of 
civil liability litigation against law enforcement officers” (Chiabi, 1995: 3) in the U.S. today.  
Contributing to the lucrative use of 42 U.S.C. is the §1988 provision for the recovery of 
attorney’s fees
35
 which are not available in a New York state lawsuit.
36
  
Thus, while it is apparent that the recent U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of 42 USC 
have led to increases in the number of lawsuits brought against police officers and/or their 
departments and in civil liability to their municipalities, arguably these decisions seem to be in 
keeping with the efforts of courts to control police misconduct through deterrence (Owen v. City 
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 1980).  
 
Civil liability as deterrence. 
Fundamental to the use of civil liability as a method of controlling police misconduct is 
the courts’ advocacy of civil liability’s deterrent power. Premised on the belief that even the 
mere “threat of litigation and civil liability” is enough to deter a police officer’s future 
misconduct (City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 575, 1986)
37
 many judicial decisions, from the 
U.S. Supreme Court down to the lower courts, are replete with opinions on, and advocacy for, 
the deterrent power of civil liability. In the words of Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Antonin Scalia “[t]he damages a plaintiff recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of 
civil rights violations” (Memphis or her Community School Board v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 
1986:307).  Furthermore, more than mere advocacy for the deterrent power of civil liability, in 
17 
 
2006 the U.S. Supreme Court limited the application of the exclusionary rule in holding that civil 
liability, not the suppression of evidence, was the appropriate remedy for a particular police 
violation of a state law.
38
 
Nevertheless, despite decades of judicial advocacy and reliance on the power of civil 
liability, or the threat of it, at deterring future police misconduct, its effectiveness continues to be 
unsettled and contentious.
39
 Some argue that civil liability deters future police misconduct 
(Fallon & Meltzer, 1991; Giles, 2000), and others contending that it does not (Armacost, 2003; 
Levinson, 2000; Miller, 1998).  Proponents of the deterrent power of civil liability as a method 
of controlling police misconduct point to studies that found that police officers believed that civil 
liability was a deterrent (Avery & Rudovsky, 1981; Champion, 1988; Garrison, 1995; Hall et al., 
2003; Hughes, 2001; Nahmod, 1982, 1984, 1986).
40
 In contrast, some studies have reported that 
although police officers expressed concern about civil liability, their concerns did not translate to 
their interactions with citizens on the street (Kappeler et al., 2001; Garrison, 1995). In fact 
Novak et al. (2003), in their survey and observation of thousands of police encounters with 
citizens, found that not only did most officers initiate aggressive behavior and were undeterred 
by the prospect of a civil lawsuit,
41
 but that officers who were previously sued were more 
aggressive than those who were not. These studies support the position that police officers not 
only are undeterred by civil liability or the threat of it but, because of indemnification, the 
potential that they would be personally liable is slight (Davis, Small & Wohlberg, 1979; Meltzer, 
1988; Miller, 1999); for often they, and even their supervisors, are unaware that substantial 
monetary awards could be assessed against their municipality (City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 





In the case of the NYPD, some have argued that deterrence is particularly ineffective 
being that the City, like most U.S. municipalities, defends and indemnifies the individual officer 





The City’s policy of indemnification is covered under the provisions of the New York 
General Municipal Law (“GML”) which states that the City will indemnify and provide legal 
representation to defend any public employee in a civil lawsuit that arises while that employee 
was acting under color of law and in discharge of his or her duties and was not in violation of 
any rule or regulation of his or her agency at the time the alleged act or omission occurred 
(McKinney’s, 2000).  In the case of the NYPD, if a police officer is sued for an incident 
occurring while carrying out his or her duties and if he or she is not violating any NYPD rule or 
regulation
44
 while doing so, the City will provide legal representation and may pay part, most or 
all, of any settlement or jury award that will result. 
This model of indemnification appears to be standard throughout the U.S. in that most 
municipal employers indemnify their police officers for any settlement or jury award that 
resulted from a lawsuit when the police officer acted under color of law (Davis et al., 1979). This 
is evidenced in a study of §1983 lawsuits in Central California by Eisenberg et al. (1987) that 
failed to find a single case in which the police officer sued was not indemnified by the 
municipality regardless of the violation alleged. 
Indemnification of police officers, even when they are found to have violated the 
constitution that they are sworn to uphold, has led some to argue that civil litigation is an 
ineffective method of punishing the individual officer and/or deterring him or her and others 
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from future misconduct (Amnesty International, 2000; Armacost, 2004; Ass’n of The Bar of The 
City of N.Y. COMM. 2000; Hoffman, 1993; Levinson, 2000). This is so, it is argued, because 
police officers are so far removed from the litigation process that they have no knowledge when 
lawsuits settle and the amount of the settlement (Emery and Mazel, 2000). Therefore, unless the 
individual officer suffers some financial penalty he or she will not be deterred from future 
misconduct (Davis et al., 1979).  In contrast supporters of indemnification argue that not only is 
indemnification not guaranteed to the officer being sued (Armacost, 1998), but without it the 
social, financial and emotional harm (Davis et al., 1979; Giles, 2000; Schlanger, 2003) that 
resulted can deter public service where the financial rewards pale in comparison to the costs of 
civil liability (Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 1977; Howard, 2009).
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Nevertheless the increasing costs of civil liability resulting from police misconduct 
lawsuits has led some scholars to propose different ways of maintaining the delicate balance 
between controlling police misconduct and the unique function of policing. These suggestions 
include using injunctive relief instead of a damages action (Giles, 2000), subtracting litigation 
costs from police department budgets (Miller and Wright, 2004) and the British model of 
requiring police officers, not unlike U.S. physicians, to have individual liability insurance (Otu, 
2005). Although the British model of “policing the police” (Otu, 2005) appears promising, if for 
no reason other than that it has been successfully implemented in a major jurisdiction, to date it 
has not been tried in the U.S. and it is debatable if the political climate in most major U.S. 
jurisdictions, and New York in particular, would be open to it. 
What exists in New York City as well as in most U.S. jurisdictions is the allotment of 
part of the settlement or jury award to the individual police officer that is somewhat proportional 
to his or her violating conduct.
46
 However, because apportionment oftentimes is lopsided to the 
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detriment of the taxpayer
 47
 some have argued for a more balanced approach to the allotment of 
civil liability (Emery and Mazel, 2000). Again, given the political climate and the strength of the 
police union in the City,
48
 more proportional civil liability may not be a viable option and 
arguably may not further one of the general deterrent aims of civil liability: the incentive for 
police departments to better train their officers.  
 
Theoretical Explanations for Police Misconduct 
 Because most acts that constitute police misconduct are criminal when done without legal 
authority or legal justification most theoretical explanations of police misconduct are 
applications of existing criminological theories. Besides, some behaviors such as the use of foul 
language, sleeping on the job, and the acceptance of free meals, though considered to be police 
misconduct, are not criminal and arguably are best explained by adaptations of criminological 
theories, such as Kappeler et al.’s (1998) “police worldview” explanation of police deviance 
rather than by pure criminological theories. For example, in contending that police officers are 
products of the society and that misconduct results not from personal characteristics but from the 
confluence of the police organization’s subculture, the community and the law, Kappeler’s 
“police worldview” can explain an officer’s acceptance of a free meal believing that “it comes 
with the job” and a proprietor giving it believing that it was not a bribe but the “right thing to do” 
to put his establishment in a more privileged position within the police subculture. In other words 
it is the meeting of subculture, community and law that provides police officers with neutralizing 
techniques based on non-legal standards that allow them the rationalization and justification for 
their misconduct (Champion, 2001; Kappeler et al., 1998). 
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However, while Kappeler’s “police worldview” is able to explain police misconduct that 
is legal, police misconduct that is illegal, such as that contained in the data of the study, can best 
be explained by Gottfredson and Hirschi’s control theory (1990) and Edwin Sutherland’s 
differential association theory (1947).  
Control theory proposes that individuals refrain from deviance and conform to the legal 
definitions of their society because they are bonded to it. The strength of the societal bond is 
controlled by, and varies, depending on the individual’s belief in the norms of their society, their 
attachment and commitment to the social institutions, and their involvement in the conventional 
activities within the society. Specifically, the individual’s self-control developed through his 
socialization prevents him from becoming deviant (Hirschi, 1969). Deviance is therefore a 
product of a lack of control and weakened or severed societal bonds and as such prior deviant 
and criminal behavior can predict future offending. In fact, research by Cohen and Chaiken 
(1973) support this in finding that police officers accused of misconduct were likely to have 
questionable past employment histories such as prior job dismissals and discipline problems in 
the military if they so served prior to their police employment.
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Nevertheless, while control theory can explain a police officer’s misconduct as a 
continuation of prior malfeasance, arguably it cannot account for a new officer with strong 
societal bonds becoming deviant after exposure to an existing police subculture.
50
  Developed in 
the 1940’s, differential association theory asserts that deviance is present in normative conflict 
because in modern societies definitions of law both favorable and unfavorable to its violation 
exists (Sutherland, 1947). Differential association is the process by which individuals experience 
these conflicting definitions. The balance of, and exposure to, these definitions determine 
whether or not the individual will engage in conforming or deviant conduct, in that an excess of 
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definitions favorable to the violation of law provides powerful reference conduct for individuals 
associated with it (Conser, 1979).  
In application differential association theory suggests that police misconduct is learned 
by the individual officer in being associated with deviant conduct generated by non-conforming 
officers within the police subculture and by being isolated from the law-abiding members of the 
general public.  
The police subculture characterized by conservatism, solidarity and a code of silence 
(Kampanakis, 2002) provides an excess of malpractice definitions that directly affects the 
individual’s conduct and allows officers ample opportunities to rationalize and justify their 
misconduct (Kappeler et al., 1998). In other words in a police subculture where misconduct is 
tolerated or even encouraged, the individual police officer learns favorable definitions of 
misconduct that are acceptable within the subculture (Aultman, 1977; Conser, 1979). Research 
has documented not only the existence of police subcultures (Conser, 1979) but has also found 
that the attitude of police academy recruits change in becoming more accepting of peer 
misconduct with the recruits increasing exposure to the police subculture as they advance from 
academy to the streets (Savitz, 1970). Thus, differential association theory provides an 
explanation not only for individual officer misconduct but also group malfeasance such as in the 
Rodney King beating or group indifference or collusion as in the police sodomy of Abner 
Louima. 
Furthermore, as detailed earlier, one of the requirements for success in §1983 lawsuits is 
the plaintiff’s showing of a “practice, usage or custom” within the police department (Monell, 
1978). Differential association suggests that such a showing is more possible within a police 
subculture that tolerates or encourages misconduct.  
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Together, control theory and differential association theory can explain allegations of 
police misconduct in lawsuits against a single or multiple police officers and have helped in 




Chapter III: Methodology  
 
As mentioned earlier, police misconduct is difficult to document. One source of data is 
the individual police officer or police official. What’s more, not only is it difficult to get 
information from individual officers or police officials (Collins, 1988) but because of the 
homogenous nature of police culture, findings from research at the individual level may be 
mixed, ambiguous and lack variability (McManus, 1969; Grant and Grant, 1996). Though 
somewhat more reliable than research at the individual level (Kane and White, 2009) research at 
the organizational level may nonetheless reflect an organizational subculture of policies formed 
by administrators but executed by individual police officers. For example, some police 
organizations may have a “siege mentality” of “them versus us” that permits and even 
encourages violent misconduct by individual police officers to maintain order on the streets 
(Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). In such cases research at the organizational level may also be limited 
by its lack of variability but more importantly may suffer from external validity in that 
administrative officials and supervisors in different police organizations may differ in what 
constitutes police misconduct in their particular organization.  
 To overcome these difficulties many previous studies have used a variety of data sources 
including publicly available official data such as civilian complaints to study police misconduct 
(Kinnaird, 2006, Lawton et al., 2001; Lersch 1998a, 1996, 2002; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2000; 
Terril & McCluskey, 2002). While such data are well suited to study the conduct of public 
officials (Henggeler et al., 1996), civilian complaints present a particular set of limitations 
including under and over-reporting problems (Walker & Bumphus, 1992) and the problem of 
perception as to what constitutes police misconduct. Prior research showed that not only do the 
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public and police officers differ as to what constitutes misconduct (Adams, 1996; Lersch, 1998b; 
Lersch and Mieczkowski, 2000) but also that more active police officers were likely to receive 
more civilian complaints of misconduct than less active officers whether or not the conduct 
complained of was within departmental guidelines (Lersch, 2002). 
This study limited these weaknesses by using information from court files of police 
misconduct lawsuits in Kings County, New York brought against the NYPD during the years 
2006-2010.  In examining and describing the impact of allegations of police misconduct in Kings 
County during the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil liability the study differed from 
prior studies in two additional ways. First, the study was specific to the NYPD. Prior research 
such as that of Chiabi (1996), in analyzing lawsuits alleging §1983 violations included Bivens 
actions, i.e. lawsuits filed against federal law enforcement officers as well as the NYPD. Second, 
in collecting data from both the Eastern District Court and Kings County state courts the study 
captured all NYPD misconduct lawsuits filed in Kings County for the period 2006-2010 and 
provided a more complete picture of police misconduct in Kings County and of civil liability to 
the City of New York that resulted from police misconduct in Kings County. 
 
Data 
The data were collected from all publicly available court files containing lawsuits brought 
both in Kings County state courts and the Eastern District Court of New York (because police 
misconduct lawsuits alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 can be brought in either federal or 
state courts).
 51
 For example, if the alleged police misconduct was only a violation of a federal 
constitutional or federal statutory right, such as an illegal search, then the forum was either a 
U.S. District Court or a New York state court.  If the allegations of misconduct raised both 
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federal and state issues, as they often did, then again the plaintiff could have chosen either 
forum
52
 and, oftentimes chose both for strategic reasons.
53
 In addition, if the alleged misconduct 
did not involve a federal constitutional or federal statutory violation,
 54
 such as a state tort of 
assault and battery, then the forum was a New York state court; most often the New York State 
Supreme Court.  
Court files from the U.S. Eastern District Court were reviewed to eliminate allegations of 
police misconduct in Queens, Nassau, Suffolk and Richmond counties and allegations against 
federal employees (Bivens actions).  In other words only misconduct lawsuits against the NYPD 
arising from an incident that occurred in 2006-2010 in Kings County whether filed in a Kings 
Court state court or the Eastern District Court were analyzed. Information including 
demographics, the precinct having jurisdiction over the location of the incident, the violation 
alleged and particulars of the disposition were collected. 
There were 2076 civil lawsuits filed against the City of New York alleging police 
misconduct in Kings County for the period 2006-2010. Of these 609 cases were eliminated for 
several reasons. Most of them were eliminated because they imposed no liability on the City 
having been abandoned, dismissed by the courts or decided for the City after a jury trial. A few 
cases, even though they imposed liability on the City during 2006-2010, were eliminated because 
the incident occurred before 2006. For example, the largest liability imposed on the City during 
the years of the study was a 2010 settlement of $9.9 million for 19 years of wrongful 
imprisonment following a false arrest. However, although the lawsuit was filed in 2006 and 
disposed of in 2010, it was eliminated from the dataset because the incident occurred in 1984. 
After such eliminations the remaining 1467 cases resolved either by settlement or trial 




































Most police misconduct lawsuits against the NYPD were based on an alleged violation of 
the New York State Constitution and or the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment guaranty of 
the right to be free from search and seizure without probable cause. Based on the nature of the 
police action, the violation may have alleged a false arrest/imprisonment; an assault/battery; or a 
police shooting. While these allegations were all based on police acting without probable cause 
and were independent of each other, an assault/battery and a police shooting were based on the 
specific claim that police used more force than was reasonably necessary (excessive force)  in 
the incident at issue. 
Also, a plaintiff could allege that inadequate police training was the cause of the 
violation. In other words regardless of, and in addition to, the primary violation (a false arrest, a 
police assault or a police shooting) a plaintiff could also allege inadequate police training. When 
an allegation of inadequate police training is successful, the settlement or jury award is 
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exponentially greater than without it. Because of this, for the purpose of this study, an allegation 
of inadequate police training was used in this study as being independent of its primary 
allegation. 
 As expected, most lawsuits alleged multiple violations. Therefore the study used 
anticipated cost to determine the primacy of the allegation. Specifically, if a lawsuit alleged 
inadequate police training then it was determined to be the primary allegation.  If the primary 
allegation was a police shooting but did not allege that it was caused by inadequate police 
training then, a police shooting was the primary allegation analyzed. A police assault was the 
primary allegation when there was neither an allegation of a police shooting or of inadequate 
police training. Finally, a false arrest was the allegation used when it was alleged and no other 
allegation was claimed. 
Thus, police misconduct was operationalized as a categorical group variable with four 
independent variables: an allegation of a false arrest, an allegation of a police assault; an 
allegation of a police shooting and an allegation of inadequate police training. 
 
Independent Variables  
An allegation of a false arrest was a claim that a police officer acting under color of law 
violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from search and seizure by making 
the arrest without the legally required probable cause to do so.  
An allegation of a police shooting was a claim that police violated the individual’s Fourth 




An allegation of assault/battery:  Although these were two separate acts they were usually 
pled and adjudicated together. An allegation of assault/ battery was again based on the claim that 
police used more force than was reasonably necessary. 
An allegation of inadequate police training was a secondary claim that the primary 
violation was the result of the officer’s deliberate indifference to the rights of the violated 
individual which occurred because of inadequate police training.   
For statistical comparison and uniformity, the selected allegations mirrored the categories 
used by the Comptroller in compiling his annual report with one notable exception: an allegation 
of inadequate police training.
55
 Although inadequate police training was absent as a separate 
category in the Comptroller’s yearly analysis it was an independent variable in the study for 
three reasons. First, prior research has shown that inadequate police training subjected 
municipalities to civil liability (Collins, 1997). In fact when successful an allegation of 
inadequate police training results in an exponentially larger award than the primary violation by 
itself. Second, some lawsuits against the NYPD included this allegation regardless of the 
violation alleged and when successful resulted in a large financial disposition. Third, in 
suggesting that prior deviant and criminal conduct can predict future offending, control theory 
infers that police officers who were the subjects of allegations of inadequate police training were 
likely to have prior incidents of misconduct in their previous employment, or current police, 
personnel files. Because a police officer’s personnel file, redacted of personal information such 
as the officer’s home address, is subject to discovery, prior incidents of police misconduct 
contained in the file may have helped to substantiate claims of negligent hiring, training and 
retention and in doing so result in an exponentially larger civil disposition than if there were no 
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prior incidents. For these reasons, an allegation of inadequate police training was used as the 
principal allegation independent of, and instead of, its primary allegation. 
Finally, differential association theory suggests that in the police subculture there are 
definitions of the Fourth Amendment that are both favorable and unfavorable to its violation. For 
this reason, differential association theory suggests that when there is an excess of definitions 
favorable to its violation some police officers may not only stop, search and seize without Fourth 
Amendment justification (reasonable suspicion and probable cause)
56
 but may have used 
excessive force in doing so. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Regardless of what was alleged a lawsuit was disposed of in one of four ways. First, it 
was abandoned or discontinued by the plaintiff. If a lawsuit was abandoned or discontinued then 
for the purpose of the study, it had no impact on the City’s civil liability given that compared to a 
settlement or judgment only a nominal amount of money was spent on investigating the 
allegations of police misconduct. Second, a lawsuit was summarily dismissed by the court. Again 
for the purpose of the study a dismissal had no impact on the City’s civil liability. Third, a 
lawsuit could have been settled by the parties at any point of the litigation process prior to a jury 
award. Lastly, a lawsuit was disposed of with a jury award against the City. Either of the last two 
methods of disposition (settlement or jury award) resulted in civil liability to the City. Therefore, 
the dependent group variable civil liability comprised the following three dependent variables: 
Disposition Method, Disposition Cost, and Disposition Time. 
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Disposition Method: this was the legal method by which the lawsuit was resolved. It was a 
dichotomous variable comprising a settlement or a jury award. Deposition method was coded 0 
for a jury trial and 1 for a settlement. 
Disposition Cost: this was the monetary amount accepted to dispose of the lawsuit. If the method 
of disposition was a settlement then the disposition cost was the amount agreed to by plaintiff 
and defendant to resolve the lawsuit. If the plaintiff and defendant did not settle the lawsuit and it 
proceeded to a jury trial then the disposition cost was the monetary amount awarded to the 
plaintiff by the jury. Disposition cost was measured in dollars. 
 Disposition Time: this was the time that it took for the lawsuit to be resolved, from filing to 
disposition. In addition to the disposition cost imposed on the defendant by settlement or a jury 
award when the lawsuit is successful, less obvious costs are incurred by both parties. For the City 
like any other defendant, less obvious costs include the salaries of attorneys and investigators, 
the costs of experts and of doctors to determine the nature and permanency of injury that the 
plaintiff alleged. Because measuring their actual costs was beyond the scope of this study, 
disposition time, a continuous variable, was used as a measure of these costs. Disposition Time 
was measured in months. 
 
Control Variables 
While previous studies that used lawsuits to study police misconduct in general (Kappeler 
& Kappeler, 1992; Kappeler, Kappeler, delCarmen, 1993; Schafer, Martinelli & Loper, 2001) 
and police misconduct in New York in particular (Chiabi, 1995) did not use control variables, 








The following hypotheses were used to examine and describe the impact of allegations of 
police misconduct in Kings County for the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil liability: 
 
H1: Allegations of false arrest were likely to result in a settlement as the disposition 
method. 
H2: Allegations of false arrest were more likely to result in a smaller final disposition 
when settlement was the disposition method than if tried by a jury. 
H3: Allegations of assault/battery were likely to result in a settlement as the disposition 
method. 
H4: Allegations of assault/battery were more likely to result in a smaller final disposition 
when settlement was the disposition method than if tried by a jury. 
H5
:
 Allegations of a police shooting were likely to result in a settlement as the disposition 
method. 
H6: Allegations of a police shooting were more likely to result in a smaller final 
disposition when settlement was disposition method than if tried by a jury. 
H7: Allegations of inadequate police training were likely to result in a jury trial as the 
disposition method. 
H8: Allegations of inadequate police training were more likely to result in a smaller final 
disposition when a jury trial was the disposition method than if tried by a jury. 
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H9: Allegations of an assault were likely to take less time to settle than allegations of a 
police shooting. 
H10: Allegations of a police shooting were likely to take less time to be tried than 
allegations of inadequate police training. 
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Chapter IV: Data Analysis 
 
The purpose of the study was to examine and describe the impact of allegations of police 
misconduct in Kings County, New York during the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil 
liability. While many studies have documented the financial impact of police misconduct on 
municipalities, none had studied the financial impact specific to Kings County, New York and 
the New York Police Department.  
In this chapter the findings of the study are presented within the context of the research 
question in three sections. In the first section frequency distributions, percentages and descriptive 
summary statistics are presented to engender an understanding of the data and provide a 
foundation for the inferential analyses of sections II and III. 
In Section II a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted to determine 
whether or not a statistically significant relationship existed between the group variable police 
misconduct (a false arrest, a police assault, a police shooting and inadequate police training) and the 
dependent variable disposition method. The analysis also examined the nature of the relationship 
to determine if the gender of the plaintiff and/or whether or not the plaintiff was represented by 
legal counsel may have had a confounding effect on the relationship. As opposed to multiple 
univariate tests, a multivariate analysis was used to reduce the probability of making a family-
wise error (Field, 2009). 
An examination of the data in Section I revealed that the dependent variables disposition 
time and disposition cost were positively skewed outside the boundaries of normality, +3/ -3 
(Onwuebuzie & Daniel, 2002).  As a result in Section III a non-parametric K independent 
samples Kruskal-Wallis analysis was used to determine and examine the relationship between 
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police misconduct and the dependent variables disposition time and disposition cost. This 
analysis was followed by a series of Mann-Whitney U tests to determine the independence of the 
independent variables that comprised the group variable police misconduct. 
In the final part of Section III the hypotheses relating to the effect that the disposition 
method had on the statistically significant relationships of police misconduct and the dependent 




There were 1467 lawsuits (N=1467) available for analysis in the study. This represented 
all the lawsuits filed in Kings County, New York for incidents of alleged police misconduct that 
occurred in the years 2006-2010 and resolved with civil liability to New York City. 
Various descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.1- 4.1.2. As shown, an 
overwhelming number of persons alleging police misconduct were male (76.3%) and so were the 
police officers (96.0%) against whom these allegations were made. As in other studies most 
lawsuits were brought by a single plaintiff (Chiabi, 1995; Rudovsky, 1992) and in this study 
93.4% of all lawsuits were against a lone police officer. Approximately 94.1% of litigants were 
represented by counsel while 5.9% represented themselves. In contrast to the other descriptive 
statistics, the chosen forum for litigation was less skewed with 68.2% of plaintiffs choosing the 
US District Court (federal) to adjudicate their lawsuits and 31.8% choosing a Kings County State 
court. Comparatively, a small number of lawsuits (4.5%) were brought by parents on behalf of 
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TABLE 4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics: Court & Representation 











No 84 5.9 







State 465 31.8 
 
As shown in Table 4.2 there were 118 allegations that resulted in civil liability to the City 
in 2006 compared to 438 in 2010, an increase of more than 371%. The data also showed that 
except for an allegation of inadequate police training, the incidence of which peaked in 2009, 
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allegations of police misconduct increased yearly during 2006-2010 with the most significant 
increase being allegations of false arrest which in 2010 were four times their 2006 amount. More 
specifically, while allegations of police shootings and inadequate police training fluctuated 
during 2006-2010, allegations of false arrests and police assaults increased steadily in each year 
of that period. These statistics appear to be in keeping with the reported increases in the number 
of persons being stopped and frisked during the same period.  
 
 
Table 4.2 No. of Allegations and City’s Liability by Year 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals 
Arrest (#) 50 84 141 144 200 619 
Assault (#) 59 127 186 189 224 785 
Shooting (#) 2 3 4 4 5 18 
Training (#) 7 5 11 13 9 45 




Of interest was the difference in incidents alleged when comparing units within police 
jurisdiction. As presented in Table 4.3 Kings County’s 66
th
 precinct had the lowest number of 
allegations made against its officers while the 75
th
 precinct had the highest. Also of interest is the 
fact that the top 5 precincts, in terms of the number of police misconduct lawsuits, were in 







Table 4.3 Incidents by Police Jurisdiction 2006-2010 





























































As incidents of police misconduct increased during the years studied so did the 
percentage of cases being settled compared to those that went to trial. Table 4.4 shows that twice 
as many lawsuits were settled (66.9%) as were tried (33.1%) during 2006-2010. This indicates 
that in most lawsuits the parties preferred to settle rather than risk the uncertainty of a jury trial. 
However, while there were yearly increases in the number of lawsuits being settled as opposed to 
those that went to trial, this was not so for all violations. For as depicted in Fig. A, of the 42 






















2006 118 58.47 41.53 
2007 219 52.05 47.95 
2008 342 63.45 36.55 
2009 350 72.85 27.15 
2010 438 72.60 27.40 





Table 4.5 shows that overall the City spent more than $56.2 mil. to dispose of lawsuits 
alleging police misconduct that occurred during the years 2006-2010 in Kings County. The data 
also showed a steady increase in the yearly costs of police misconduct from $5.1 mil. in 2006 to 
more than $15 mil in 2010. Besides, as was expected, disposition cost differed by violation 
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alleged. Allegations of false arrest and police assault while responsible for 95.7% of all 
allegations, accounted for approximately $41.7 million and 74.3% of the City expenditure for 
police misconduct occurring during 2006-2010. In contrast, 45 allegations of inadequate police 
training consisting of 3% of all allegations costs approximately $12.1 million and 21.6% of the 
City’s civil liability for police misconduct for the years 2006-2010. 
 
 



















































Although the incidents of police misconduct and their resulting costs increased over the 
period studied as shown in Table 4.6 their mean cost decreased. For example, the average cost to 
settle a lawsuit alleging police misconduct in 2006 was $36,660 but $33,855 in 2010. Similarly, 


























































































































An analysis of the disposition method by allegation as presented in Fig. B shows that the 
average cost of settling a lawsuit alleging a false arrest or a police shooting was more than the 
cost of a jury trial. In fact the average cost of a settlement for an allegation of a false arrest was 
twice the cost of a trial. However, as predicted by hypotheses 4 and 6 allegations of a police 






In contrast to the decrease in the average cost to the City for a lawsuit alleging police 
misconduct, the cost to a police officer when named as an individual party to the lawsuit steadily 
increased during the years from 2006 to 2010. In 2006 the average costs was $30,833 but 
$103,625 in 2010. However, the overwhelming majority of police officers were not named 
individually, for they were named defendants in only 3 cases in 2006, 2 in 2007, 4 in 2008, 4 in 
2009 and 4 in 2010. So, while police officers were personally and partially liable for misconduct 
occurring in 2006-2010 in a total of 17 lawsuits, the City was liable in 1467 lawsuits. 
 
 




Avg. Costs to City 
 
Avg. Cost to Named 
Officer 
2006 43,271 30,833 
2007 36,219 35,000 
2008 38,823 58,874 
2009 42,423 85,750 
2010 34,421 103,625 





The mean disposition time (from the filing of a lawsuit to its final resolution) for police 
misconduct lawsuits in Kings County for the period studied was 15.72 months, with a range of 
an average minimum time of 9.05 months for settlement of a lawsuit alleging a false arrest to 
43.87 months for a trial of an allegation of inadequate police training as depicted in Fig. C.  
Furthermore, the mean time to dispose of a lawsuit by settlement differed significantly from that 
of a trial for the same type of allegation. This was particularly so for allegations of inadequate 
police training which took an average of 2.16 months to settle, compared to 43.87 months to be 









Police Misconduct and Disposition Method 
A multinomial logistic regression analysis was used to determine if there was a 
statistically significant relationship between the group variable police misconduct and the 
dependent variable disposition method, and to examine its nature if it existed. The results 
presented in Table 4.9 show an initial log likelihood value of 115.077, and after the independent 
variables were accounted for in the logistic regression model, a final log likelihood value of 
54.441. The difference between the initial and final log likelihood value, the model’s Chi-square 
value of 60.635, had a significance of p = .000 indicating that a statistically significant 
relationship existed between police misconduct and the method used to dispose of a lawsuit. 
However, while the relationship was weak, (Nagelkerke R
2
 = .045), overall the model was 
accurate for 68.9% of the relationships observed. 
The analysis also shows that the gender of the plaintiff did not affect whether or not a 
lawsuit was settled or went to trial. By comparison, whether or not the plaintiff was represented 
by counsel did. In fact the odds ratios indicate that a lawsuit in which the plaintiff was 
represented by counsel was 2.7 times more likely to be disposed of by settlement than by trial. 
The standard error values and B coefficients were small indicating that there were no numerical 
problems with the model. Wald statistics show that the independent variables that comprise the 
group variable police misconduct had independent statistically significant relationships with the 
disposition method.  
The odds ratio of independent variable to the disposition method shows that a lawsuit in 
which the principal allegations was a false arrest or an assault had a positive effect on the 
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disposition model and was more than 9 times more likely to be settled than proceed to a jury 
trial. An allegation of a police shooting was 11.6 times more likely to be settled than tried. 
Finally, an allegation of inadequate police training had a 9% more likelihood of being tried rather 
than settled.  
In summary the results indicate statistical significant support for hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 7. 
 
 
Table 4.8 Regression: Police Misconduct and Disposition Method 
 
Model Fitting 
-2 Log likelihood (intercept) Chi-square: 115.077 
Model R
2
 Chi-square df Significance 
-2 Log Likelihood 0.45 54.441   
Improvement  60.355 5 .000 




Settlement Trial Percent correct 
Settlement 973 8 99.2% 
Trial 447 37 7.6% 
Overall 96.9% 3.1% 68.9% 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect 
Model Fitting Likelihood Ratio 
-2 Log Likelihood Model Chi-square Df Significance 
Gender (Plaintiff) 54.613 1.72 1 .678 
Representation (plaintiff) 67.018 12.577 1 .000 





Table 4.9 Significant Predictors (Reference: Trial) 
Variable Wald Df Significance Exp(B) 
Gender (Plaintiff) .171 1 .679 1.057 
Representation (Plaintiff) 10.350 1 .001 2.718 
Settlement/ Arrest 32.835 1 .000 9.924 
Settlement/ Assault 32.875 1 .000 9.823 
Settlement/ Shooting 13.961 1 .000 11.685 
Significant Predictors (Reference: Settlement) 





A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to evaluate the differences among the four 
independent variables of the group variable police misconduct (arrest, assault, shooting, training) 
and their relationships with both disposition time and disposition cost. Tied ranks were corrected 
with the substitution of the median. 
As shown in Table 4.8, overall there was a statistically significant relationship between 
disposition time and police misconduct, χ² (3, N=1467) = 98.400, p = .000 with a mean rank 
disposition time of 651.29 for a false arrest, 764.31 for a police assault, 924.94 for a police 
shooting and 1250.92 for an allegation of inadequate police training. Similarly, there was a 
statistically significant relationship between disposition cost and police misconduct, χ² (3, 
N=1467) = 211.344, p = .000 with a mean rank disposition cost of 574.52 for a false arrest, 
819.56 for a police assault, 1083.19 for a police shooting and 1255.46 for an allegation of 





Table 4.10 Independent-Samples Median Test 
Dependent Variable Disposition Time Disposition Cost 
N 1467 1467 
Mean Rank (False Arrest) 651.29 574.52 
Mean Rank (Police Assault) 764.31 819.56 
Mean Rank (Police Shooting) 924.94 1083.19 
Mean Rank (Inadequate police training) 1250.92 1295.46 
Test Statistic 98.400 211.344 
Degrees of Freedom 3 3 
Asymptotic Sig. .000 .000 
 
 
While the Kruskal-Wallis test determined that there were statistically significant 
relationships between the independent variables as a group and both disposition time and 
disposition cost, to determine the nature of the relationship, (i.e., independence of each 
independent variable and its individual relationship with disposition time and disposition cost), a 
series of Mann-Whitney U tests of two-way comparisons were conducted. Effect size values for 
each compared pair were manually calculated. The results are presented in Table 4.8.1 below. 
There were statistically significant differences in the distributions of the independent 
variables within the group variable police misconduct to affect both disposition time and 
disposition cost. Specifically, all four independent variables had statistically significant 
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independent effects on disposition cost. However, when paired, a police assault and a police 
shooting did not have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable disposition time; 
whereas the remaining paired comparisons were statistically significant. In other words, a police 
assault and a police shooting were not independent of each other in their effect on the time it 
took to dispose of the lawsuit. 
In summary the Kruskal-Wallis tests followed by post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests 
showed that except for the relationship of police assaults and police shooting on disposition time, 
the individual variables that comprised police misconduct had independent effects on both the 




Table 4.11 Independent Variables on Disposition Time and Disposition Cost 
Disposition Time Disposition Cost 
 
Arrest/Assault 
Statistic df Sig.  Eff. Size Statistic df Sig Eff. Size 
204552.000 1 .000 -0.1350 151999.000 1 .000 -0.3232 
Arrest/Shooting 3474.000 1 .006 -0.1080 2217.000 1 .000 -0.1730 
Arrest/Training 3234.000 1 .000 -0.3341 809.500 1 .000 -0.4104 
Assault/Shooting 5476.000 1 .104 -0.0057 4039.500 1 .002 -0.1099 
Assault/Training 5280.000 1 .000 -0.2746 1533.500 1 .000 -0.3583 
Shooting/Training 174.000 1 .000 -0.4424 193.000 1 .001 -0.4068 
 
Police Misconduct and Disposition Cost 
Binomial logistic regressions were performed to test hypotheses 2, 4, 6, and 8. Table 
4.10.1 shows that the model explained a low 15% (Nagelkerke R
2
) of the variance of the 
interaction of an arrest and settlement with disposition cost and was accurate in 69.3 % of the 
interactions observed (Table 4.10.2). The Wald statistic (135.4006, p = .000) presented in Table 
4.10.3 indicates that the interaction had a statistically significant contribution to the disposition 
cost and that a one unit change in the interaction would result in a 40% change in the disposition 
cost. As such there was statistically significant support for the hypothesis that allegations of false 
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arrest were likely to result in a smaller final disposition when settlement was the disposition 
method than if tried by a jury. 
The binomial regression model presented in Table 4.10.1 explained 29% (Nagelkerke R
2
) 
of the variance in the interaction of a police assault and settlement as the disposition method with 
disposition cost. The model was accurate in 66.6% of the interactions observed. The Wald 
statistic 29.545, p = .000, shows that the interaction was a statistically significant contributor to 
predicting that allegations of assault/battery were likely to result in a smaller final disposition 
when settlement was the disposition method than if tried by a jury. As such, hypothesis 4 was 
supported. 
For hypothesis 6 which states that allegations of a police shooting were likely to result in 
a smaller final disposition when settlement was the disposition method than if tried by a jury, 
Table 4.10.1 shows that the model explained a low 2% (Nagelkerke R
2
) of the variance of an 
allegation of a police shooting and settlement interacting with disposition cost. The model was 
accurate in 92.9 % of the interactions observed (Table 4.10.2). The Wald statistic (1.332, p = 
.249, p > .05) presented in Table 4.10.3 indicates that the interaction did not have a statistically 
significant contribution to the disposition cost. As such, there was no statistically significant 
support for hypothesis 6. 
Lastly, as presented in Table 4.10.1 the binomial regression model explained 30% 
(Nagelkerke R
2
) of the variance of the interaction of an allegation of inadequate police training 
and settlement with disposition cost. Overall the model was accurate in 97.2% of the interactions 
observed. Furthermore, the Wald statistic 96.259, p = .000, p < 0.5, shows that the interaction 
was a statistically significant contributor to the prediction that allegations of inadequate police 
training were likely to result in a smaller final disposition when a jury trial was the disposition 
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method than when settled. Furthermore, the odds ratio (Exp(B)) shows that a one unit change in 
the interaction would result in only a 1% change in the odds of a trial as the disposition method 
and therefore hypothesis 8 was supported. 
Table 4.12.1 Model Summary 
Variable Step -2 Log Likelihood Nagelkerke R
2
 
Arrest/Settlement < Median Disp. Cost 1642.323 .150 
Assault/Settlement < Median Disp. Cost 1838.423 .029 
Shooting/Settlement < Median Disp. Cost 749.626 .002 
Training/Settlement < Median Disp. Cost 269.981 .305 
 
Table 4.12.2 Classification 
Variable Predicted < Median Overall % Correct 
Arrest/Settlement 920 69.3 
Assault/Settlement 977 66.6 
Shooting/Settlement 1363 92.9 
Training/Trial 1426 97.2 
 
Table 4.12.3 Variables in the Equation 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Arrest/Settlement -2.810 .241 135.406 1 .000 .060 
Assault/Settlement .710 .058 29.545 1 .000 .339 
Shooting/Settlement .481 .417 1.332 1 .249 1.618 





Police Misconduct and Disposition Time 
Two binomial logistic regressions were performed to test hypothesis 9 and 10. The 
analysis presented in Table 4.11.1 shows that the regression model explained 26.6% (Nagelkerke 
R
2
) of the variance of the interaction of an assault and settlement with disposition time. The 
Wald statistic (F(113.260,1 p = .000) presented in Table 4.11.2 indicates statistical significance 
for the prediction that allegations of an assault were likely to take less time to settle than 
allegations of a police shooting, thus supporting hypothesis #9.  
Hypothesis 10 was also supported in that the binomial logistic regression model 
explained 14.1% of the variance of the interaction of police shooting lawsuits that went to trial 
with the median time. The model was statistically significant (F= (176.310, p =.000), and was 
accurate for 72.9% of the interactions observed, and a unit increase in the interaction resulted in 




Table 4.13.1 Model Summary 
Variable Step -2 Log Likelihood Nagelkerke R
2
 
Assault/Settlement < Median Disp. Time 1389.796 .216 
Shooting/Trial < Median Disp. Time 1474.180 .141 
 
Table 4.13.2 Classification 
Variable Predicted < Median  Overall % Correct 
Arrest/Settlement 1114 74.8 
Shooting/Trial 1069 72.9 
   
52 
 
Table 4.13.3 Variables in the Equation 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Arrest/Settlement 5.391 .507 113.260 1 .000 219.508 




Analysis of the data revealed that overall there were statistically significant relationships 
between police misconduct, the method by which the City disposed of a lawsuit against the 
NYPD, its cost and the time it took to reach the disposition. In addition, as Table 4.14 shows, all 
hypotheses were supported except Hypothesis 6. Specifically, the analysis showed no 
statistically significant support for the prediction that allegations of a police shooting were likely 
to result in a smaller final disposition when settlement was the disposition method than when 
tried by a jury.  
 
 Table 4.14 Interpreting Results of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis p-Value Sig. p-Value Interpretation Conclusion 
Hyp. 1 p = .000 P < 0.5 Strong evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
Hyp. 2 p < .000 P < 0.5 Strong evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
Hyp. 3   p = .000 P < 0.5 Strong evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
Hyp. 4 p = .000 P < 0.5 Strong evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
Hyp. 5  P = .000 P < 0.5 Strong evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
Hyp. 6  P = .249 P > 0.5 Strong evidence for Ho Fail to Reject Ho 
Hyp. 7 P = .000 P < 0.5 Weak evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
Hyp. 8 P = .000 P < 0.5 Weak evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
Hyp. 9 p= .000 P < 0.5 Strong evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
Hyp. 10 p= .000 P < 0.5 Moderate evidence against Ho Reject Ho 
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Chapter V: Findings, Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
In this chapter the principal findings and conclusions of the study are reviewed and 
discussed within the context of the research hypotheses. Based on the findings several 
conclusions, policy implications and recommendations are made. 
 
Findings 
 The study examined the impact of police misconduct in Kings County on New York 
City’s civil liability during the years 2006-2010. Using allegations of police misconduct that 
resulted in a settlement or jury award as a measure of police misconduct, the study provided 
evidence of the increasing costs of police misconduct in Kings County. 
Specifically, the study found that most police defendants were male as were most of the 
individuals alleging police misconduct. In fact female police officers were under-represented in 
lawsuits in Kings County given that reportedly they comprise 34% of total number of sworn 
officers of the NYPD (NYC Workforce Project Report, 2013). Disproportionality was also 
present in violations alleged when analyzed by police jurisdictions with the 75
th
 precinct having 
the most lawsuits brought against its officers and the 66
th
 having the least. 
Of the allegations comprising police misconduct, false arrests were the most numerous 
comprising 54.14% of all violations alleged, followed by allegations of police assault. Together, 
allegations of false arrests and police assaults accounted for 95.7% of the total number of 
allegations made and 74.3% of the City’s total civil liability for police misconduct in Kings 
County for the years studied. 
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The study also found that an allegation of inadequate police training that was tried before 
a jury was the most costly to the City with an average cost of $175,000, while a false arrest 
allegation, with an average cost of $8,500 when tried was the least costly. 
Based on previous studies, in particular that of Gould and Mastrofski (2004), it was 
hypothesized that a lawsuit based on the principal allegation of a false arrest would be more 
likely to settle than go to trial. The data showed that of the 619 allegations of false arrest more 
than 68% were settled and the analysis provided statistically significant support for this 
prediction. In contrast, the analysis provided statistically significant support for settlement of an 
arrest allegation being less costly than a trial. The data did not bear this out for it was more than 
twice as expensive to settle arrest allegations, than to try them before a jury. For all other 
allegations the study found settlement to be the less expensive method of disposition. 
Lastly, legal representation, and not gender of the plaintiff was statistically significant in 
determining whether or not a lawsuit was settled or tried. The majority of litigants were 
represented by counsel and the majority of cases were settled (54.4%) with an average 
disposition time ranging from 9.05 months to settle an allegation of a false arrest to 20.16 months 
for settlement of an allegation of inadequate police training. 
Overall, although the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct almost quadrupled 
from 2006 to 2010, the average cost of a lawsuit alleging police misconduct decreased 
significantly during the years studied from $43,271 in 2006 to $34,421 in 2010. By comparison, 
the personal cost to the police officer when named as an individual defendant increased 






The study produced both anticipated and unexpected results in that although many of the 
relationships identified were anticipated, some were not.  
It was anticipated, in part due to the City’s Stop, Question and Possibly Frisk policy, that 
not only would there be increases in the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct, but that 
most plaintiffs would allege assault/battery or false arrest as their principal allegation and that 
together false arrest and police assault would account for the major part of the City’s civil 
liability. Also anticipated was the finding that most individuals alleging police misconduct would 
be represented by counsel and that legal representation would be predictive of whether or not a 
lawsuit would be settled or would proceed to trial. 
As to individual allegations it was anticipated that on average it would be less costly to 
settle a lawsuit than to proceed to trial; however, settling a lawsuit when the principal allegation 
was a false arrest was shown to be a lot more costly than a jury trial. Nonetheless, the data shows 
that 68.7% of the 619 lawsuits alleging false arrest were settled although on average it costs 
$11,500 more to do so. The likely reasons for this practice could be the sheer number of false 
arrest lawsuits and the extended disposition time indicative of the litigation costs of a trial 
compared to a settlement. 
The most costly of the allegations found by the study was that of inadequate police 
training, which on average was $25,000 more costly when tried before a jury than when settled 
and had a much longer disposition time of 43.87 months for trial compared to 20.16 months for 
settlement. Still, 82.2% of lawsuits alleging inadequate police training were disposed of by trial 
rather than with a settlement even though it was more costly to the City to do so. One likely 
explanation for this is that plaintiff’s settlement demand was a lot higher than what was offered 
56 
 
by the City and City attorneys believed that a jury award, particularly in a low profile lawsuit, 
would be less than plaintiff’s demand. Conversely, it is also possible that plaintiff’s attorney 
believed that a jury award would be larger than the amount offered by City attorneys. 
What was unexpected, however, were the yearly decreases in the average cost of a 
lawsuit to the City, and in contrast the increases in the average cost to the police officer when a 
named defendant in the lawsuit. Interestingly, as an ancillary finding, all 17 lawsuits in which a 
police officer was found to be individually liable for the violation alleged were jury trials. Unlike 
other counties in New York State, juries in Kings County and the Bronx tend to reflect the racial 
composition of the county (NYS Chief Administrative Law Judge Report, 2011). With non-
whites comprising 56% of the population of Kings County (U.S. Census, 2010) and the top five 
precincts in terms of violations alleged all having jurisdiction in neighborhoods of color most 
affected by “Stop and Frisk”, it is possible that jury awards in these trials reflect the sentiment of 
jurors towards police officers and not the actual evidence presented in lawsuits. 
Furthermore, because police officers’ CCRB files are subject to disclosure, it is possible 
that as suggested by control theory the individually named officers may have had multiple 
civilian complaints and disciplinary actions against them in their disclosed personnel files which 
may have influenced the jury resulting in higher awards against them. 
Also, although it was anticipated that there would be differences in allegations when 
examined by police jurisdiction, it was not anticipated that the 75
th
 Precinct would have more 
than 25 times the number of lawsuits filed against its officers as the 66
th 
Precinct, which had the 
lowest number of allegations. For context, available data published by the NYPD shows that 
during the years 2001-2013 incidents of reported crime decreased 85% from 7,927 to 1,191 in 
the 66
th





(NYPD CompStat, 2014). Therefore, it is quite possible that, particularly in a high crime police 
jurisdiction, such as in the 75
th
 Precinct, the high number of lawsuits is the price of doing 
business as some have suggested (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). 
Another possible explanation that is suggested by differential theory is that in these 
precincts with relatively high number of lawsuits against its officers there is a police subculture 
that tolerates and may even accept police misconduct. Although only 6.6% of the lawsuits of the 
study involved multiple police officers, and while it is outside the scope of this study it would be 
interesting to determine if these 47 lawsuits were concentrated in any particular precincts or 
dispersed throughout Kings County.  For as suggested by differential association, such group 
malfeasance or collusion may show acceptance of definitions favorable to the violation of law 
existing in those particular precincts. 
In conclusion the increasing financial impact that police misconduct had on the City 
during the years studied was not the result of increasing costs of the lawsuit per se but rather the 
increase in the number of lawsuits vis-à-vis the increase in the incidence of police misconduct. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
There are several possible limitations to the study. First, in using allegations of police 
misconduct to measure police misconduct, it is recognized that not all incidents of police 
misconduct result in a civil lawsuit. Indeed, police misconduct lawsuits are incidents of alleged 
misconduct that have been brought to the attention of the judicial system. As such it is possible 
that incidents of police misconduct may be more numerous than the number of lawsuits filed. 
Second, there are frivolous lawsuits and therefore even when a settlement or judgment 
results, in other words an admission or finding of police misconduct, it is quite possible that what 
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was alleged may not have occurred.
57
 This limitation is evident in the fact that for the years 
studied a low 3% of police misconduct claims filed with the CCRB was substantiated.
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However, despite this low degree of substantiation it is recognized that because police officials 
and officers tend to define police misconduct narrowly while the public defines it broadly 
(Adams, 1996; Lersch, 1998b; Lersch and Mieczkowski, 2000), and complaints include claims 
such as the use of foul language and discourtesies, which are not legally actionable, arguably 3% 
substantiation is not truly indicative of the frivolity of some legal claims. 
Thus, while the use of lawsuits to examine police misconduct in Kings County provided a 
select sample of cases, they provided a reliable and credible source of information due to the 
scrutiny of many different professionals engaged in the adversarial judicial process and therefore 
these limitations did not threaten the validity of the study. 
 
Policy Implications 
The finding that overall the impact of police misconduct on the City’s civil liability is the 
result of increases in the number of lawsuits being filed, i.e. the incidence of police misconduct 
and not a rise in the average cost of the lawsuit, points to a two-prong approach to policies 
regarding police misconduct and its impact on civil liability of New York City. First, policies 
aimed at preventing police misconduct, and second policies aimed at managing its costs when it 
occurs. 
Preventing police misconduct starts at the academy. Past research shows that cadets are 
concerned about work-related lawsuits (Scogin and Brodsky, 1991) but on becoming a part of a 
subculture that may accept police misconduct as a way of doing business, their conduct is not 
only shaped by the subculture (Kappeler et al., 1998) but they become more accepting of 
59 
 
misconduct as they progress from academy to the streets (Savitz, 1970). Therefore, beyond the 
possibility of dismissal from the NYPD, cadets should be instructed not only of the potential 
personal costs they face for misconduct when they are named individually in a lawsuit, but also 
as important, the civil liability to the City and the social cost to its residents.  
While preventing police misconduct requires additional misconduct specific instruction at 
the academy, it is recognized that this may not be enough as police officers and officials are 
often unaware of the outcomes of police misconduct lawsuits (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). This 
suggests that police officers must be informed of the legal proceeding in which they are 
involved. Continued awareness of the existence and potential cost of police misconduct may 
mean regular updates of on-going lawsuits at roll call or, and, one-on-one meetings with their 
supervisors so that they may be more aware of the impact of their conduct on their department 
and the City. Awareness may also mean the creation of a database specific to police misconduct 
actions and issuance of reports to individual officers and their supervisors keeping them apprised 
of the progress of the lawsuit. For if police misconduct lawsuits are inevitable, not because they 
result from aggressive policing but from the subjective difference of 34,000 police officers 
defining inappropriate conduct narrowly and 8 million New Yorkers defining it broadly, then the 
study suggests that current policies that have led to decreases in the average cost of a lawsuit for 
the years studied should continue. Specifically, the findings suggest that there should be a 
vigorous effort to increase the use settlement rather than jury trials not only because on average 
settlement is 37% less costly but additionally the time to get to disposition is on average 
approximately 50% less for a settlement than for a trial. 
In spite of these recommendations, it is realized that there will always be outliers, i.e., 
police officers who are undeterred by civil lawsuits. For example, a recent report by the New 
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York Daily News detailed a two-month investigation of the most sued police officers in New 
York City.
59
  According to the report 55 NYPD officers, who had more than 10 lawsuits against 
each of them, were responsible for a total of 609 misconduct lawsuits and $6 million in civil 
liability. One particular officer had been sued 28 times in the past 8 years at a cost to the City of 
$1.3 mil. When presented with the cost of his conduct to the City, the detective allegedly replied 
“I am unaware of that” and “once it goes to court, I don’t follow it”, supporting the contention of 
Skolnick and Fyfe (1993). From this it appears that existing accountability mechanisms need to 
be reformed and, where inadequate, new mechanisms put in place. One possible accountability 
mechanism could require the police officer involved in the alleged violation, even when he or 
she is not a named defendant, to be informed of the progress of the lawsuit through regular, 
required communications with City attorneys. 
If all else fails then officers who continually engage in misconduct should be taken off of 
the streets and assigned to desk duty or dismissed. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
Prior research has provided a general understanding of the relationship of police 
misconduct and civil liability. This study provided a more nuanced understanding of police 
misconduct in Kings County, New York.  
Future studies can build on this research particularly in the area of a more expansive 
measure for litigation costs. Furthermore, while this research did not evaluate the adequacy of 
NYPD training programs at preventing police misconduct, it showed the continuing need for 
programs that address the impact that police misconduct has on the civil liability of the City of 
the New York. One possibility for future research therefore would be an evaluation of the 
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adequacy of current NYPD academy training programs specific to the prevention of police 
misconduct. Lastly, the finding of disproportionality in the number of lawsuits when analyzed by 
precinct suggests a more in-depth precinct-level analysis in the future that could explain the 
extent to which police misconduct at that level is accepted as a way of doing business in certain 






 Of notable exception is the view that some police departments accept increased civil liability as 
the price for aggressive policing (Armacost, 2003). Others even encourage civil liability by 
appearing to be tough on crime as a way of increasing police funding for their departments 
(Miller & Wright, 2000). 
 
2
 Starting with Elizabeth Holtzman (1989-1993), successive comptrollers (William Thompson 
2002-2009; John Liu 2009-current) have expressed concern and made various administrative 
efforts to reduce civil liability that results from police misconduct. Infra see note at 1. 
 
3
 In general a lawsuit alleging unconstitutional policies or practices is brought against a 
municipality, in this case the City, and not the police department itself. In New York this is 
codified in Sec. 396 of the New York City Charter which in relevant part states that “all 
actions . . . for the violation of any law should be brought in the name of the City of New 
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 For example, police sergeant Dorst agreed to pay $5000 of a $250,000 settlement. Dorst was 
alleged to have sexually harassed a subordinate police officer by repeatedly demanding sex 
from her while telling her that “it is going to be the best one minute of your life.” John 
Marzulli. Harassed Cop Wins 250G. It’ll be best minute of your life, creepy sarge told her. 
N.Y. Daily News, December 20, 2006. Sec.: News, p. 18. 
 
48
  In lawsuits in which the police officer is charged with intentionally violating the individual’s 
constitutional rights, the City refuses to defend and indemnify the named police officer 
accused of constitutional violations, the police union steps in and does both. See Louima v. 
City of New York et al. In this case defendants settled for $8.6 million dollars with the City 
paying $7 million and the PBA, the remaining $1.6 million. William Rashbaum. Settlement 







 For NYPD officers, part of the legal process in a §1983 lawsuit alleging police misconduct is 
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